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INTRODUCTION
Accompanying police is a traditional way for reporters to get
colorful stories about crime and law enforcement.' Police, in turn,
have used the opportunity to boost their public image by having
journalists witness and publish stories of their deeds.2 Real-life
drama television shows, featuring footage of law enforcement
officers and other emergency workers on their jobs, are unsurpris-
ing extensions of this tradition. Because government agencies do
* B.A. Indiana University-Bloomington, 1991; candidate for J.D. Indiana
University School of Law-Bloomington, 1994.
1. Lyle Denniston, Reporters with Cops Compelled to Testify, WASH. JOURNALISM
REV., July/Aug. 1990, at 40, 40.
2. See Jon Katz, Covering the Cops, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., JanIFeb. 1993,
at 25, 26-27. Some police departments do not allow camera crews to accompany their
officers. Richard Zoglin, The Cops and the Cameras, TIME, Apr. 6, 1992, at 62, 62.
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not want an unfavorable appearance of secrecy,3 these shows are
able to pressure agencies to permit journalists to tag along.'
The reporters accompany the officers, often riding in patrol
cars, running after suspects, visiting crime scenes, and going onto
private property. The television shows capture on film not only the
police on patrol, but also chases, searches, seizures, arrests, and
questioning of witnesses, suspects, and arrestees' Often the film
includes material that could be useful in a later trial. Due to the
First Amendment, though, litigants who want the information may
have a court battle against the reporters. The defendants and
prosecutors must prove several elements in order to use material
that is not yet broadcast or published.
Such was the case when criminal defendant Babatunde Ayeni
subpoenaed CBS, requesting unbroadcast film, or "outtakes," of a
May 5, 1992, Secret Service search of his apartment.7 The
government agents, who had a valid warrant to look for evidence
of credit card fraud, permitted a CBS news crew to accompany
them and film the search.' The camera crew entered with the
officers, one of whom wore a wireless microphone for the benefit
of the reporters,9 and filmed approximately twenty minutes for the
program Street Stories.1"
The defendant was not home during the search, although his
wife and young son were. The wife neither gave the reporters
permission to enter nor asked them to leave, but did repeatedly
express her desire not to be photographed. According to the judge
who later reviewed the film, her words and tone indicated that she
3. Jane Hall, Judge Says 'Reality' TV Can't Join Raids, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 23,
1992, at Fl, F12 (statement of Martin Garbus, First Amendment lawyer).
4. Jane Hall, Ruling May Affect Taping of Searches, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1992,
at Fl, F11.
5. See Katz, supra note 2, at 26.
6. See, e.g., Network Must Give Grand Jury 48 Hours Outtakes of Arrest, NEWS
MEDIA & L., Summer 1991, at 13.
7. United States v. Sanusi, 813 F. Supp. 149 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
8. Id. at 151.
9. Id. at 152.
10. Hall, Judge Says 'Reality' TV Can't Join Raids, supra note 3, at Fl.
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assumed the camera crew was an authorized government partici-
pant in the search. 1
Defendant Ayeni wanted the tape because it contained
information potentially relevant to his motions to dismiss and to
suppress, as well as his defense against charges of conspiring to
commit and committing credit card fraud."2 CBS moved to quash
the subpoena on First Amendment grounds.
13
In United States v. Sanusi, apparently a case of first
impression, 4 Judge Jack B. Weinstein ordered CBS to provide
the tape requested by defendant Ayeni, granting the motion to
quash only to the extent that CBS could block out the identity of
its Secret Service source. 5 The court held that although a
qualified newsgathering privilege protected the outtakes from
disclosure, the defendant met an established three-part test and
overcame CBS's privilege.1 6 By meeting the elements of the test,
the defendant proved that his interests in the tape outweighed the
reporters' First Amendment interests.
Rather than end the decision after deciding that the defendant
had overcome CBS's privilege not to testify, the court added a
new limitation to the traditional test. According to Judge
Weinstein, the First Amendment privilege not to testify would
operate "weakly, if at all' 7 because CBS had acted illegally by
entering Ayeni's home without either Ayeni's consent or that of
his family. 8
11. Sanusi, 813 F. Supp. at 152.
12. Id. at 151.
13. Id.
14. Hall, Judge Says 'Reality' TV Can't Join Raids, supra note 3, at F12 (statement
of Henry Rossbacher, attorney for defendant Ayeni).
15. Sanusi, 813 F. Supp. at 151. CBS said it would comply with the decision to
produce the tapes. Hall, Judge Says 'Reality' TV Can't Join Raids, supra note 3, at F12.
16. Sanusi, 813 F. Supp. at 159-60. The test required that the tape be "(1) highly
material and relevant; (2) necessary or critical to the maintenance of the [defendant's]
claim; and (3) not obtainable from other sources." Id. at 154.
17. Id. at 160.
18. Id. The court also criticized the Secret Service for permitting the reporters to be
a part of the search. "While not rising to the level of misconduct required to dismiss an
indictment, such behavior cannot be tolerated. Agents of the executive branch must
understand the gravity of their role when a judicial officer authorizes their presence in
a private person's home." Id. at 161. Judge Weinstein directed the United States
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The court's new element raises two issues: (1) whether the
decision that the camera crew's behavior was in fact illegal was
properly made and (2) whether illegal conduct should affect the
privilege not to testify. An analysis of these two issues shows that
the court's limitation on the reporters' First Amendment privilege
not to testify was inappropriate.
First, it is not clear that the CBS news crew engaged in any
illegal conduct, even though the judge, without the aid of a jury,
decided that it did.19 The question of the journalists' conduct is
better answered in a separate action where the reporter can be
prosecuted or sued if necessary. Second, illegal conduct during
newsgathering should not bar or limit the reporters' First Amend-
ment right not to testify. The traditional three-part test adequately
protects the interests of the party requesting the information by
permitting the First Amendment privilege to be overcome where
necessary. The policies underlying the reporters' privilege are
served, while the interests of the individual involved are given due
consideration.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE REPORTERS' PRIVILEGE
Privileges come from several places, including statutes,2"
Attorney to bring the case to the attention of the highest authority in the United States
Secret Service. Id.
19. Id. at 160.
20. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 76.2 (John W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992) (e.g.,
clergy-penitent). The Supreme Court has invited legislatures to pass shield laws, which
would give statutory protection to journalists who have been subpoenaed. Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 706 (1972). A majority of states have done so. See, e.g., ALA.
CODE § 12-21-142 (1986); ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.25.150-.220 (1983); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 12-2214, -2237 (1982 & Supp. 1993); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-85-510 (Michie
1987); CAL. Evm. CODE § 1070 (West Supp. 1994); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-90-
119, 24-72.5-101 to -106 (West Supp. 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4320-4326
(1974); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-4701 to -4704 (Supp. 1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-30
(Michie Supp. 1993); IND. CODE § 34-3-5-1 (1983); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.100
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:1451-1458 (West 1982 &
Supp. 1993); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-112 (1989); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 767.5a (Supp. 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 595.021-.025 (West 1988 & Supp. 1994);
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 26-1-901 to -903 (1993); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-144 to -147
(1991); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49.275 (Michie 1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-21
to -21.9, -29 (West 1976 & Supp. 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 11-514 (Michie 1976);
N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (McKinney 1992); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06.2
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common law,21 and constitutions.22 Although federal courts have
historically rejected a common law privilege protecting journalists
from revealing information,'s many have relatively recently
recognized a qualified First Amendment privilege protecting
confidential, unbroadcast, or unpublished materials-both sources
and information-from compelled disclosure, regardless of
whether the source has consented to disclosure. The reporters'
First Amendment privilege may apply in both civil and criminal
cases, although not with consistent force.24
The reason for rejecting a common law privilege is that
journalists, unlike doctors or attorneys, who have common law
privileges, are not professionals. Consequently, there may be
(1976); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2739.04, 2739.12 (Anderson 1992); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 2506 (West 1993); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 44.510-.540 (1988); 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 5942 (1982); RI. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-19.1-1 to -3 (1985); TEN. CODE ANN.
§ 24-1-208 (Supp. 1993).
Although similar proposals have been made in Congress, the federal government
has not passed a law shielding journalists from compelled testimony. See, e.g., H.R. 215,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 2015, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 837, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). The first federal shield bill was introduced in 1929. HARVEY L.
ZUCKMAN ET AL., MASS COMMUNICATIONS LAW IN A NUTSHELL 294 (3d ed. 1988).
In federal courts state-created privileges, such as reporters' shield laws, apply only
in civil actions and proceedings where the rule of decision of an element of a claim or
defense is supplied by state law; otherwise, federal privileges apply. FED. R. EVID. 501.
Where a civil action in federal court contains both federal and state claims or defenses,
privileges should be evaluated under both state and federal law. Lipinski v. Skinner, 781
F. Supp. 131, 135 (N.D.N.Y. 1991) (citing Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n
v. National Football League, 89 F.RD. 489, 492 (C.D. Cal. 1981)).
21. See McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 20, § 75 (e.g., attorney-client or
doctor-patient).
22. E.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V (guaranteeing right not to testify against oneself);
see also MCCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 20, §§ 114-143.
California has adopted a shield law provision in its constitution, CAL. CONST. art.
I, § 2(b), in addition to its shield statute, CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West Supp. 1994).
23. See Carl C. Monk, Evidentiary Privilege for Journalists' Sources: Theory and
Statutory Protection, 51 Mo. L. REV. 1, 18 (1986).
24. See Continental Cablevision, Inc. v. Storer Brdcst. Co., 583 F. Supp. 427, 433
(E.D. Mo. 1984).
25. William M. Bulger, Reporter's Privilege by Rule of Court: New Approach Fails
... Or Does It?, 19 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 513, 535 (1985).
[Doctors and lawyers] are bound by canons of ethics far more demanding than
the civil and criminal law, and can lose their right to practice if they violate
those codes. There is no comparable ethical discipline governing the conduct
ofjournalists, no coercive supervision which binds them to universal standards.
Number 3]
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less societal benefit in their having the privilege.26 Although it is
generally agreed that doctors and lawyers require confidential
relationships in order to function,27 the same theory is disputed
with regard to journalists.2' Testimonial privileges are also
limited because of the principle that courts have "a right to every
man's evidence."29
The First Amendment suggests, however, that the press as an
institution may have special constitutional advantages beyond
those afforded to individuals.
It is tempting to suggest that freedom of the press means only that
newspaper publishers are guaranteed freedom of expression. They
are guaranteed that freedom, to be sure, but so are we all, because
of the Free Speech Clause. If the Free Press guarantee meant no
more than freedom of expression, it would be a constitutional
redundancy.... By including both guarantees in the First Amend-
ment, the Founders quite clearly recognized the distinction between
the two.3°
The argument for a First Amendment reporters' privilege not
to testify was first made in Garland v. Torre,31 in which Judy
Garland alleged that columnist Marie Torre defamed her. Torre,
attributing the statements in question to an unnamed CBS
executive, claimed that she was not required to reveal a journalis-
tic source. 2 Judge (later Justice) Potter Stewart affirmed her
26. See ZUCKMAN ET AL., supra note 20, at 293.
27. Jack Colldeweih & Samuel Pleasants, Confidential Sources-The Reporter's
Privilege Muddle, COMM. & L., Dec. 1991, at 3, 3.
28. Compare Bulger, supra note 25, at 534 ("[T]hrough most of our existence as a
nation we needed no testimonial privilege to have the freest and most aggressive press
in the world. The privilege is sought to meet a nonexistent problem.") with Monk, supra
note 23, at 4 ("If... we seek a media that presents facts or occurrences not so generally
available-the product of investigative reporting like that exemplified by publication of
the Pentagon papers and the Watergate expose-then the privilege is important to a full
and satisfactory exercise of the profession.').
29. United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950); see also ZUCKMAN ET AL.,
supra note 20, at 293.
30. Potter Stewart, "Or of the Press", 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 633-34 (1975)
(emphasis in original). But see Anthony Lewis, A Preferred Position for Journalism?,
7 HoFsTRA L. Rv. 595, 605 (1979) ("No Supreme Court decision has held or intimated
that journalism has a preferred constitutional position.").
31. Garland, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958); see also
ZUCKMAN ET AL., supra note 20, at 295.
32. Garland, 259 F.2d at 547.
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contempt conviction, but recognized that compulsory disclosure
may hinder the freedom of the press. 33 Because freedom of the
press is not absolute, a balance was required to compare journalis-
tic abridgement to the need for the testimony.34
The Supreme Court has not explicitly stated whether the First
Amendment ever provides journalists with a privilege not to
testify.35 The Court, in its 1972 three-case consolidated opinion
Branzburg v. Hayes, held that the reporters in those cases were not
constitutionally protected from testifying to grand juries about
their eyewitness accounts of criminal activity.36 The decision was
limited, however, and left open the question of whether journalists
may have the privilege in other situations.
The Court's emphasis on the importance of grand juries and
investigating crime suggests that reporters may have a privilege
not to testify in other contexts. Justice Powell's concurring opinion
explicitly supports this idea. Justice Powell stated, "The Court
does not hold that newsmen, subpoenaed to testify before a grand
jury, are without constitutional rights with respect to the gathering
of news or in safeguarding their sources., 37 Reporters, according
to Justice Powell, may make a motion to quash if the grand jury
investigation is not being conducted in good faith.38
Five justices-four dissenters plus Justice Powell concur-
ring-stated that reporters may have at least a qualified privilege
not to testify about their sources.39 One of the dissenters, Justice
Douglas, would have held that reporters have an absolute
privilege.40 This head-counting,41 along with the limiting com-
33. Id. at 548.
34. Id. ("What must be determined is whether the interest to be served by
compelling the testimony of the witness in the present case justifies some impairment
of this First Amendment freedom.").
35. See, e.g., Colldeweih & Pleasants, supra note 27, at 3.
36. Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665, 708 (1972).
37. Id. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring), 712 (Douglas, J., dissenting), 743 (Stewart,
J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 712 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
41. The decision has also been characterized as "four and a half to four and a half."
Stewart, supra note 30, at 635.
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ments in the opinion of the Court, has permitted many jurisdic-
tions to construe the First Amendment to provide the press with
a privilege not to testify,42 commonly protecting both sources and
information.43
In several ways, this testimonial privilege encourages more
in-depth news coverage and investigative reporting. First, not only
would sources be less willing to provide information if the
reporter were later compelled to identify the source publicly, but
being required to testify takes time, money, and other journalistic
resources from the reporters. 44
[B]ecause journalists typically gather information about accidents,
crimes, and other matters of special interest that often give rise to
litigation, attempts to obtain evidence by subjecting the press to
discovery as a nonparty would be widespread if not restricted. The
practical burdens on time and resources, as well as the consequent
diversion of journalistic effort and disruption of newsgathering
activity, would be particularly inimical to the vigor of a free
press.45
42. See, e.g., United States v. LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d 1176, 1181 (lst Cir.
1988); LaRouche v. NBC, 780 F.2d 1134, 1139 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 818
(1986); In re Selcraig, 705 F.2d 789, 792 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Burke, 700
F.2d 70, 77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 816 (1983); Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705,
714 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1126 (1981); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433, 437
(10th Cir. 1977); Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464, 467 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427
U.S. 912 (1976); see also Timothy B. Dyk, Newsgathering, Press Access, and the First
Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REv. 927, 929 (1992).
But see In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 810 F.2d 580, 584 (6th Cir. 1987)
(Branzburg did not recognize reporters' privilege although many courts have interpreted
it as extending a qualified privilege); In re Farber, 394 A.2d 330, 334 (N.J.) (no
privilege in criminal cases), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978).
43. See, e.g., LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d 1176; Burke, 700 F.2d 70.
44. LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d at 1182.
45. O'Neill v. Oakgrove Constr., Inc., 523 N.E.2d 277, 279 (N.Y. 1988). A 1991
survey by the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press found that of 1010 media
institutions who answered the survey, 34.2% of the print media respondents and 68.9%
of the broadcast respondents said they were served at least one subpoena that year. Ruth
Piller, Subpoenas a Drain on the Press; Process Takes Resources from News-gathering,
Report Finds, HOUSTON CHRON., Feb. 11, 1993, at A10. Television stations averaged
7.41 subpoenas each in 1991. COMM. DAILY, Mar. 11, 1993, at 8. A little more than half
of all the subpoenas were connected to criminal cases. Piller, supra, at A10.
What we keep finding... is that it's a tremendously expensive proposition for
journalists to fight these subpoenas, both in terms of money and in terms of
staff time. I wish we could be more persuasive, to communicate to the judges
[Vol. 46
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Second, the press would face the possible image of being an
arm of law enforcement, rather than a neutral observer. If parties
were routinely allowed to subpoena news information for private
purposes, the media's autonomy would be jeopardized. 46 "There
is virtual unanimity within journalism, print and electronic alike,
that the primary obligation of the press in reporting about criminal
activity is to serve, both in fact and in public perception, as an
instrument of public information, not as an arm of law-enforce-
ment."47 The possibility of testifying later can cause reporters to
forego newsgathering in order to avoid the image of the press as
an arm of law enforcement.48
Although Branzburg discussed the First Amendment privilege
not to testify about confidential information, the First Amendment
is commonly interpreted to provide the press with a qualified
privilege protecting any unpublished information, regardless of its
confidentiality.49 Compelled production of unpublished informa-
tion can also significantly inhibit newsgathering and the editorial
process."
Compelled disclosure provides a disincentive to compile and
preserve unpublished information. 1 "We discern a lurking and
the impact that (subpoenas have) on doing what reporters are supposed to be
doing-that is, gathering news.
Id. (statement of Jane E. Kirtley, Executive Director of the Reporters Committee for
Freedom of the Press).
46. O'Neill, 523 N.E.2d at 279.
47. NATIONAL NEWS CouNciL, COVERING CRIME: How MUCH PRESS-POLICE
COOPERATION? How LrrrLE? 7 (1981).
48. See id. at 15 (21 of 49 surveyed news executives would reject opportunity to
accompany law enforcement if asked for quid pro quo regardless of the potential story's
quality).
49. See, e.g., United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 146-47 (3d Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1126 (1981); United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A. v. Karen
Bags, Inc., 600 F. Supp. 667, 669-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (applying privilege in case
involving outtakes); O'Neill, 523 N.E.2d at 277-78 (First Amendment provides qualified
privilege protecting nonconfidential photographs from compelled disclosure).
50. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d at 146.
51. United States v. LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d 1176, 1182 (lst Cir. 1988) ("To
the extent that compelled disclosure becomes commonplace, it seems likely indeed that
internal policies of destruction of materials may be devised and choices as to subject
matter made, which could be key to avoiding disclosure requests or compliance therewith
rather than to the basic function of providing news and comment."); cf. Bill Kirtz, Media
Number 3]
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
subtle threat to journalists and their employers if disclosure,
outtakes, notes and other unused information, even if nonconfiden-
tial, becomes routinely and casually, if not cavalierly, com-
pelled., 52
The privilege is possessed by the reporter. Unlike many other
testimonial privileges, such as attorney-client and doctor-patient,
the source of the information is not capable of waiving the
privilege. 3 The journalist may be able to retain the privilege not
to testify even if the source of the information is the one request-
ing the reporter's testimony. 4
Frequently journalists may be able to resist subpoenas in both
criminal and civil trials.5 5 Some courts have held that the privi-
lege applies in either type of case because the effect on news-
gathering does not change with the nature of the action;56
however, in civil trials where the reporter is not a party courts
may allow for a greater privilege than in criminal trials or civil
actions with a media defendant.5 ' The privilege may operate
weakly or not at all in criminal trials where the defendant has a
Lawyer: Saving Notes Can Hurt You, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Jan. 25, 1992, at 16 (media
lawyer advising reporters that keeping notes can be harmful because the notes can be
used against the reporters in libel actions).
52. LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d at 1182.
53. E.g., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 20, § 76.2; Bulger, supra note 25,
at 535.
54. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 14 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2203 (N.D. Ill.
1987); cf Delaney v. Superior Court (Kopetman), 789 P.2d 934 (Cal. 1990) (California
constitution's shield provision can be invoked by journalist where criminal defendant
requested journalist's testimony about defendant's prior statement).
55. See, e.g., United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70, 77 (2d Cir.) (privilege applies
equally to civil or criminal cases and each uses same analysis in order to encourage
press to investigate and expose criminal activity), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 816 (1983);
United States v. Hubbard, 493 F. Supp. 202, 205 (D.D.C. 1979). But see In re Farber,
394 A.2d 330 (N.J.) (privilege does not apply in criminal case), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
997 (1978).
56. E.g., United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 1980) ("CBS's
interest in protecting confidential sources, preventing intrusion into the editorial process,
and avoiding the possibility of self-censorship created by compelled disclosure of sources
and unpublished notes does not change because a case is civil or criminal."), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1126 (1981).
57. See Continental Cablevision, Inc. v. Storer Brdcst. Co., 583 F. Supp. 427, 433
(E.D. Mo. 1984).
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constitutional right to a fair trial,58 or where the state has a
compelling interest in investigating crime.5
II. THE FACTORS FOR OVERCOMING THE PRIVILEGE
The First Amendment is not the only consideration for courts;
therefore, the privilege must be weighed against other constitution-
ally significant interbsts. The government, for example, has a
strong interest in criminal prosecutions in order to protect public
safety. Similarly, criminal defendants have a due process right to
a fair trial, as well as a Sixth Amendment right to compel
testimony at trial."
The framers of the Bill of Rights did not, however, rank the
First and the Sixth Amendments. Neither is given automatic
priority over the other when the two conflict. 1 According to
Justice Powell, courts must evaluate the First Amendment interests
against the competing societal need for relevant testimony.62 A
case-by-case balance "accords with the tried and traditional way
of adjudicating such questions."63
To balance the interests involved, courts have developed a
three-part test that weighs the needs of the party requesting the
information against the needs of the press,' making the privilege
qualified rather than absolute. In United States v. Sanusi, Judge
Weinstein added an element to the traditional test: the court must
ascertain whether the reporter used illegal means to gain the
information.6"
58. Farber, 394 A.2d 330.
59. See, e.g., Karem v. Priest, 744 F. Supp. 136, 137 (W.D. Tex. 1990).
60. The Sixth Amendment states in relevant part, "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right.., to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in
his favor." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
61. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 561, quoted in United States v.
Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1126 (1981).
62. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 710 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring).
63. Id.
64. See ZUCKMAN ET AL., supra note 20, at 299.
65. See United States v. Sanusi, 813 F. Supp. 149, 156 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
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A. The Traditional Three-Part Test
In many jurisdictions, the requesting party can overcome a
reporter's First Amendment privilege by meeting a three-part test
similar to that proposed by Justice Stewart in his Branzburg
dissent.6 Justice Stewart would require that the requesting party
(the government in Branzburg) show (1) that there is probable
cause to believe that the reporter has information that is clearly
relevant, (2) that the information cannot be obtained by alternative
means less destructive of First Amendment rights, and (3) that
there is a compelling and overriding interest in the information.67
Applying such a test, or a variation thereof,68 ensures that
a journalist's information is disclosed only when necessary for a
"fair judicial process., 69 The party requesting the information has
the burden to show that the test has been met by substantial
evidence.70 "This demanding burden has been imposed by courts
to reflect a paramount public interest in the maintenance of a
vigorous, aggressive and independent press capable of participating
in robust, unfettered debate over controversial matters, an interest
which has always been a principal concern of the First Amend-
ment."
71
Where a criminal defendant cannot prove each element of the
test, the journalist will not be required to disclose the requested
information. In United States v. Lopez,72 for example, the crimi-
nal defendant's subpoena was quashed where the requester did not
66. ZUCKMAN ET AL., supra note 20, at 299.
67. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 743 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
68. For example, under the California shield law provisions, criminal defendants
must make a threshold showing that there is a reasonable likelihood that a reporter's
information will be helpful. The court then balances the conflicting interests by
considering (1) whether the information is confidential or sensitive, (2) the interests the
shield law protects, (3) the criminal defendant's need for the information, and (4)
whether there is an alternative source. Delaney v. Superior Court (Kopetman), 789 P.2d
934, 947-51 (Cal. 1990).
69. Sanusi, 813 F. Supp. at 155.
70. In re Selcraig, 705 F.2d 789, 792 (5th Cir. 1983).
71. United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70, 77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 816
(1983).
72. Lopez, 14 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2203 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
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exhaust alternative sources and did not show how the information
was material to the defense.73 Similarly, a criminal defendant's
right to compulsory process did not overcome the subpoenaed
reporter's First Amendment qualified privilege where the requested
evidence was speculative, cumulative, and hearsay.74
Many state shield laws contain similar tests for overcoming
the privilege granted to reporters. New York, for example, protects
news and news sources unless the requester makes a clear and
specific showing of the three elements. 75 The test is not applied
rigidly. "Rather, the test should be flexibly employed, taking into
account various factors which diminish the strength of the
qualified immunity privilege. For example, 'if the questions put to
a reporter are narrowly limited, then subpoenaing a reporter is
more acceptable.' 7
6
In Sanusi, Judge Weinstein applied an accepted test, requiring
the defendant to prove three elements in order to defeat the
privilege: the information must be (1) highly material and relevant
to the claim, (2) necessary or critical to the maintenance of the
claim, and (3) obtainable from no source other than the report-
er.
77
The defendant in Sanusi claimed he required the CBS
outtakes for his motion to suppress and his motion to dismiss, as
well as for his defense.78 According to Judge Weinstein, an in
camera review of the tape showed that it contained no material
relevant to Ayeni's motions to suppress or dismiss; however, the
tape would be useful to the defendant's defense because it showed
that a thorough search uncovered nothing. Such potentially
exculpatory evidence dramatically shown on film could greatly
influence the jury.79
73. Id. at 2205-06.
74. Campbell v. Klevenhagen, 760 F. Supp. 1206, 1215-16 (S.D. Tex. 1991).
75. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h(c) (McKinney 1992).
76. Lipinski v. Skinner, 781 F. Supp. 131, 136 (N.D.N.Y. 1991) (citations omitted).
77. United States v. Sanusi, 813 F. Supp. 149, 154 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
78. Id. at 159.
79. Id.
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By inviting CBS to accompany it on its search, the Secret Service
may well have provided a basis for a finding of not guilty. The
criminal may go free, not because the constable has blundered, but
because the Secret Service and CBS have abused criminal process
in a way the average citizen may find unacceptable."0
The court seemed to brush aside the element of the test
requiring that the evidence be "necessary or critical."81 Instead
of discussing the element in detail, the court stated it was
"reluctant in a criminal case to substitute its judgment for a
defendant's on the question.""E The third criterion, requiring that
the material could not be obtained elsewhere, was satisfied
because the tape itself was obviously not available from any
source other than CBS.83
B. Sanusi's Added Restriction-Illegal Conduct
In Sanusi, Judge Weinstein added a new restriction to the
settled three-part test: before a member of the press may resist a
subpoena, "the court must be confident that the person asserting
the privilege does not do so as a means of justifying otherwise
illegal conduct., 84
In support of the additional requirement, the court examined
instances in which reporters tried to use the First Amendment to
justify crimes and torts committed in newsgathering; for example,
trespass85 and intrusion." In these cases, courts rejected the
journalists' claims, prohibiting reporters accused of crimes or torts
from using the First Amendment to preclude liability. "Because
the press in certain circumstances may be able to resist the
demands of a subpoena in some cases does not mean the press
80. Id. at 160.
81. See id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 156.
85. Id. at 155 (citing Anderson v. WROC-TV, 441 N.Y.S.2d 220 (Sup. Ct. 1981)
(reporters accompanied county humane society investigators executing search warrant)).
86. Id. at 156 (citing Dietemann v. Time, 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971) (reporters
used subterfuge to gain consent to enter defendant's home where they surreptitiously
photographed and recorded him)).
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may, simply by raising the cry of 'newsgathering,' exempt itself
from all other legal constraints. 87
The phrase "justify otherwise illegal conduct" does not,
however, seem to describe accurately the application of Judge
Weinstein's added criterion. Whereas "justify" suggests that the
reporter is trying to defend directly against liability, the relation-
ship between the possible illegal conduct and the First Amendment
claim not to testify is more attenuated. More accurately, the
court's test is that where the reporter has used illegal means to
gain the information requested, the First Amendment privilege not
to testify is barred or weakened. The privilege would not apply, or
would not completely apply, where the reporter sought not to
testify about information gained while committing a crime or a
tort.
If, for example, a journalist had stolen the subpoenaed
information, under Weinstein's test the journalist could not claim
First Amendment protection. Likewise, CBS could not claim a
First Amendment qualified privilege not to testify if it had
committed trespass while filming the search of defendant Ayeni's
apartment. The question then becomes whether the reporter
engaged in illegal conduct.
III. THE EXISTENCE OF ILLEGAL BEHAVIOR
Whether a journalist has behaved illegally or tortiously by
gathering news on private property is subject to debate."8 Courts
have decided the issue both for and against the press." Judge
87. Id. at 155.
88. Compare Kent R. Middleton, Journalists, Trespass, and Officials: Closing the
Door on Florida Publishing Co. v. Fletcher, 16 PEPP. L. REV. 259, 294 (1989) ("Despite
the newsworthiness of journalists' coverage of official activities in private homes,
journalists should have no privilege to enter private homes with officials.") with David
F. Freedman, Note, Press Passes and Trespasses: Newsgathering on Private Property,
84 COLUM. L. REv. 1298, 1342 (1984) ("[C]ourts can and should strike a balance in
newsgathering trespass cases between the press's newsgathering interests and ...
competing values.").
89. Compare Florida Publishing Co. v. Fletcher, 340 So.2d 914 (Fla. 1976)
(precluding recovery for trespass against journalists who accompanied fire marshall),
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 930 (1977) with Green Valley Sch., Inc. v. Cowles Fla. Brdcst.,
Inc., 327 So.2d 810 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (denying newspaper defendant's motion
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Weinstein, without the aid of a jury, decided that the CBS news
crew did behave illegally when it entered the Ayeni home."
In Florida Publishing Co. v. Fletcher, the plaintiff could not
recover for trespass against the newspaper where the reporters
were invited by a fire marshall and a law enforcement officer to
enter a home destroyed by fire.91 According to the court, the
homeowners had given implied consent by custom and usage.9"
Similarly, reporters in New York were not liable for trespass when
they accompanied the police who arrested the "Son of Sam"
killer.93
However, such claims against reporters are generally not
invalidated merely because the reporter, as in Sanusi, accompanied
law enforcement officers onto a person's property.94 In Green
Valley School, Inc. v. Cowles Florida Broadcasting, Inc.,95 for
example, the nonprofit corporation that operated a school raided
by police was able to sue the television station that sent two
employees to accompany the midnight raid. The court denied the
media defendants' motion for summary judgment on the claim of
malicious trespass, as well as the claims of libel and slander.
To uphold [the broadcaster's] assertion that their entry upon
[the school's] property at the time, manner, and circumstances as
reflected by this record was as a matter of law sanctioned by 'the
request of and with the consent of the State Attorney' and within
the 'common usage and custom in Florida' could well bring to the
citizenry of this state the hobnail boots of a nazi stormtrooper
equipped with glaring lights invading a couple's bedroom at
midnight with the wife hovering in her nightgown in an attempt to
shield herself from the scanning TV camera.96
After examining constitutional principles found in the Fourth
Amendment97 to evaluate the importance of individual privacy,
for summary judgment on claim of malicious trespass).
90. Sanusi, 813 F. Supp. at 160.
91. Fletcher, 340 So.2d at 916.
92. Id.
93. People v. Berliner, 3 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1942 (N.Y. Yonkers City Ct. 1978).
94. Dyk, supra note 42, at 930 n.22.
95. Green Valley Sch., 327 So.2d 810 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
96. Id. at 819 (emphasis in original).
97. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
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the Sanusi court decided that the media defendant's behavior was
not protected by the First Amendment.98 The Fourth Amendment,
although not restricting the actions of private actors such as
CBS,99 reflects the right to restrict who enters an individual's
home. Under the Fourth Amendment, the government cannot gain
entry to a home without a valid warrant or an overriding exception
to the warrant requirement"0 and, according to Judge Weinstein,
neither should the press.' 01
Although CBS was engaged in newsgathering,0 2 Judge
Weinstein decided that the reporters committed an illegal act when
they violated the defendant's privacy by filming the search. The
opinion states that "CBS ... trespassed upon defendant's
home,""1o3 but it does not state whether this was a tortious
trespass or a criminal trespass. Nor does the opinion provide a
definition of "trespass" or a list of the elements necessary for such
a finding.
violated .....
98. United States v. Sanusi, 813 F. Supp. 149, 156 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
99. Id. Reporters have been found to have acted so closely in connection with the
government that the journalists became government agents. See, e.g., United States v.
Chen, discussed in Michael Isikoff, Justice Dept. Subpoenas Unaired NBC Tapes of
Drug Seizure, WASH. POST, Jan. 18, 1992, at A3 (requiring prosecutor to subpoena
outtakes from NBC where NBC worked so closely with Customs Service during drug
surveillance and raid that an agency relationship was formed).
According to Henry Rossbacher, Ayeni's attorney, CBS did voluntarily become an
agent of the government. Hall, Judge Says 'Reality' TV Can't Join Raids, supra note 3,
at F12.
100. Sanusi, 813 F. Supp. at 158. "The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance
to all the forces of the crown. It may be frail-its roof may shake-the wind may blow
through it-the storm may enter-the rain may enter-but the King of England cannot
enter!" Id. (quoting Anderson v. WROC-TV, 441 N.Y.S.2d 220, 226 (Sup. Ct. 1981)
(quoting William Pitt)).
101. Id. "If the news media were to succeed in compelling an uninvited and non-
permitted entry into one's private home whenever it chose to do so, this would be
nothing less than a general warrant, equivalent to the writs of assistance which were
found so odious to the American colonists." Id. (quoting Anderson, 441 N.Y.S.2d at
226).
102. Id. at 159.
103. Id. at 160.
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New York has several criminal trespass statutes.' 4 Appar-
ently either trespass 115 or criminal trespass in the second de-
gree °6 could apply in this case. Both relevant trespass statutes
require that a person who commits the crime "knowingly enter[]
or remain[] unlawfully."10 7 Judge Weinstein, however, did not
consider a culpability element, but rather based the trespass
finding solely on his opinion that neither the defendant nor his
family consented to CBS's presence in the apartment. There is no
discussion of how the Secret Service's permission affected the
reporters' knowledge of unlawful behavior.
More likely Judge Weinstein considered the act a tortious
trespass, although he did not state this. In New York, a tortious
trespass does not require that the trespasser either intended to
commit a trespass or knew that the act would constitute tres-
pass.10 8 According to Judge Weinstein, neither the defendant nor
his family consented to the camera crew's presence in the
apartment, nor was there implied consent when the defendant's
wife did not ask the reporters to leave. The CBS journalists gained
access "arguably, under color of official right' 0 9 without
consent from the defendant or his family, who apparently did not
realize they could compel the reporters to leave. According to
Judge Weinstein, the reasonable person surrounded by Secret
Service agents would not realize she could exclude the camera
crew. 1 "That the woman had the presence of mind to request
that she not be photographed was, under the circumstances,
remarkable.""'
104. See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 140.05-.17 (McKinney 1988).
105. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 140.05 (McKinney 1988) ("A person is guilty of trespass
when he knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in or upon premises. Trespass is a
violation.").
106. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 140.15 (McKinney 1988) ("A person is guilty of criminal
trespass in the second degree when he knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a
dwelling. Criminal trespass in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor.').
107. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 140.05, 140.15 (McKinney 1988) (emphasis added).
108. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Bailey, 109 N.Y.S.2d 799 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
109. United States v. Sanusi, 813 F. Supp. 149, 160 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
110. Id.
11. Id.
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The opinion contains no indication that CBS knew which
trespass provision applied, had the opportunity to present a
defense, or had the option of allowing a jury to determine
elements such as culpability, if relevant, before the constitutionally
based privilege not to testify was affected. The determination of
illegal or tortious behavior by the press is better left to a separate
proceeding, where the issue will be argued fully and decided
clearly, rather than in another person's criminal trial, where the
finding of illegal behavior is vague, but the consequence-losing
a constitutionally based privilege-is grave." 2
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE SANUSI ILLEGAL
CONDUCT RESTRICTION
Even if the questions surrounding the legality of the media's
conduct were adequately decided, other issues remain concerning
the validity of the new limitation on the reporters' First Amend-
ment testimonial privilege. Although the limitation may at first
appear acceptable, a closer examination shows otherwise. The
policies behind the privilege are better served without the illegal
conduct restriction, despite the compelling facts in the Sanusi case.
Other remedies for illegal or tortious conduct are available to
respond to the underlying conduct without a broad restriction on
the testimonial privilege.
News may receive some degree of protection even where
some illegal conduct existed in its gathering. Publication, for
instance, may not be punished or prohibited even though the
112. Babatunde Ayeni's wife and son, who were in the apartment while the CBS
camera crew filmed the search, did bring a civil action against the network, the Secret
Service, and postal agents. Ayeni v. CBS Inc., 22 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1466 (E.D.N.Y.
1994). Tawa and Kayode Ayeni alleged emotional distress and violation of privacy and
the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. New York: Judge Allows
Suit over Videotaped Search, Liability Wk., Mar. 28, 1994, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Wires File. An out-of-court settlement between the plaintiffs and CBS was
reached in March 1994, although the settlement's terms were not disclosed. Joseph P.
Fried, CBS Reaches a Settlement on Videotaped Search, N.Y TIMEs, Mar. 20, 1994, § 1,
at 17. According to a CBS spokesperson, the settlement was "not an admission" that the
network had violated the Ayenis' rights. Id.
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underlying conduct used to gather the information is." Simi-
larly, the use of the information in testimony should be separated
from the manner in which it was obtained.
At first blush, Judge Weinstein seems correct to say that
before a reporter is entitled to use the First Amendment to resist
a subpoena, "the court must be confident that the person asserting
the privilege does not do so as a means of justifying otherwise
illegal conduct. 1 4 Journalists are subject to laws generally
applicable to society where enforcement has incidental effects on
the press's ability to gather and report news." 5 "There is no
threat to a free press in requiring its agents to act within the
law."'1 6 Donald Galella, for example, could not claim that
because he was newsgathering he was protected from crimes and
torts committed against former First Lady Jacqueline Kennedy
Onassis when he sought to photograph her. Galella could be liable
for harassment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, assault
and battery, commercial exploitation of Onassis's personality, and
invasion of privacy.117
The newspersons claiming the privilege not to testify are not,
however, trying to defend a direct accusation of liability for an
action. Whether the reporter is liable for some underlying conduct
is not the same question as whether the reporter may be required
to comply with a subpoena.
By requiring a decision on this separate question of whether
the reporter has engaged in illegal activity in the course of gaining
the material requested, the court is encouraging a mini-trial when
a motion to quash is filed by reporters--one in which a judge,
113. See, e.g., Nicholson v. McClatchy Newspapers, 223 Cal. Rptr. 58, 62 (Ct. App.
1986) ("ET]he First Amendment protects the ordinary news-gathering techniques of
reporters and those techniques cannot be stripped of their constitutional shield by calling
them tortious.").
114. Sanusi, 813 F. Supp. at 156.
115. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 111 S. Ct. 2513, 2518 (1991) ('[E]nforcement of
such general laws against the press is not subject to stricter scrutiny than would be
applied to enforcement against other persons or organizations.").
116. Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 995-96 (2d Cir. 1973), quoted in Sanusi, 813
F. Supp. at 155.
117. Id. at 994.
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rather than a jury, decides whether a journalist is guilty of an
illegal act.
The desire to limit the time, effort, and money that journalists
must use to respond to subpoenas is one of the underlying reasons
for the privilege not to testify." 8 Even if a jury were the
factfinder, such litigation would drain journalistic resources from
newsgathering and move them into court, where they would not
be spent for the benefit of informing the public.
Apparently, the party requesting the information need only
allege that the reporter committed any crime or tort to challenge
the reporter's motion to quash and compel the journalist to present
a defense, forcing journalistic resources to be appropriated to
expenses for litigation and testifying.
Consider that speeding is illegal. The reporter may not have
been able to meet a source or obtain particular information without
arriving at a particular place at a particular time, sooner than the
time at which the reporter would arrive driving at a legal
speed-that is, but for the illegal speeding, the reporter would not
have the information. The information would not, therefore, be
fully protected by the First Amendment. The result sounds absurd,
yet quite possible under a test where any illegal conduct by the
reporter will automatically bar or weaken the First Amendment.
That a litigant need only allege some conduct similar to speeding
in order to force the journalist to expend time, money, and other
resources for a defense is equally ludicrous.
In addition to preventing a waste or misappropriation of
journalistic resources, another purpose of the privilege not to
testify is to encourage newsgathering.119 This policy too is
hindered by the Sanusi illegal conduct restriction, even though it
may at first appear otherwise. Permitting reporters to use such a
privilege where they have committed an illegal action to obtain the
information may initially seem to be encouraging illegal conduct
when newsgathering. Instead, it allows the press to disseminate
118. United States v. LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d 1176, 1182 (1st Cir. 1988).
119. United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1126 (1981).
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necessary information to the public, without decreasing the value
of other disincentives for illegal behavior.
The 1989 Supreme Court case Florida Star v. B.J.F., ° in
which a rape victim sued the newspaper that published her name
after the newspaper had obtained it from a publicly released police
report, suggests that illegal newsgathering should not be encour-
aged. Striking down a Florida statute making it illegal to publish
rape victims' names in an instrument of mass communication, the
Supreme Court held that "where a newspaper publishes truthful
information which it has lawfully obtained, punishment may
lawfully be imposed, if at all, only when narrowly tailored to a
state interest of the highest order."
121
The Supreme Court did not, however, state whether "lawfully
obtained" was a necessary element in the case. In fact, the Court
expressly declined to decide "whether, in cases where information
has been acquired unlawfully by a newspaper or by a source,
government may ever punish not only the unlawful acquisition, but
the ensuing publication as well."
122
Judge Weinstein was able to use a very compelling set of
facts to illustrate his new rule: the camera crew went into the
defendant's home without the family's consent and took photos
that the defendant's wife expressly requested not be taken. It may
not seem fair under those circumstances that the broadcaster
should be able to keep from the defendant a tape of a search of
the defendant's apartment.
These same compelling facts, however, illustrate the potential
importance of the reporters' newsgathering. Despite the illegal
conduct, newsgathering would be discouraged if the privilege not
to testify were taken away. From Sanusi, one can see that the
benefit to society can outweigh the harm caused by the
newsgathering.
The primary purpose of the Constitution's freedom of the
press guarantee is to create an institution to serve as a check on
120. Florida Star, 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
121. Id. at 541 (emphasis added).
122. Id. at 535 n.8 (emphasis in original).
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the three official branches of government .1' The conduct of law
enforcement personnel-government agents-is a legitimate and
necessary area of public interest. 2 4
If the public is to have the capacity to review police behavior
and elicit the aid of powerful institutions, including media as well
as courts, citizens must appreciate the potentialities and limits of
police departments-and how police officers can reasonably be
expected to carry out their duties. The media can supply the
information from which such knowledge grows."z
Although traditional police reporters are disappearing from
the modem media,'26 there is a continuing need to inform
society about the day-to-day functions and duties of police and
other law enforcement officers. Television camera crews, as well
as other types of journalists, who accompany the officers on their
daily activities allow the public to understand the police more
fully, regardless of whether the show is primarily for news or
entertainment.' 7 "People used to think law enforcement was like
Dirty Harry or Miami Vice," according to Nick Navarro, a Florida
sheriff. "Shows like Cops let the American people see what the
police are really like."' 28
123. Stewart, supra note 30, at 634.
124. See, e.g., Cassidy v. ABC, 377 N.E.2d 126, 132 (1l. App. Ct. 1978) (allowing
summary judgment for defendant broadcasting company where police officer sued for
invasion of privacy after broadcaster filmed undercover police investigation of lingerie
show).
125. Jerome H. Skolnick & Candace McCoy, Police Accountability and the Media,
1984 AM. B. FOuND. REs. J. 521, 527.
126. Katz, supra note 2, at 25.
127. The co-producer and creator of Fox's Cops series claims that program should
not be grouped with other reality shows. The show features unnarrated footage of police
at work, without re-creations, music, slow motion, or retakes. Cops, which he says is
"TV's only reality police series," is "primarily entertainment programming, not
exclusively news with its accompanying umbrella of protection." Malcolm Barbour,
Counterpunch: Please Don't Lump 'Cops'with Those 'Reality'Shows, L.A. TIMES, Dec.
14, 1992, at F3.
128. Zoglin, supra note 2, at 62; see also David Johnston, Shooting Down TV's Cop
Shows, TV GUIDE, Apr. 9-15, 1983, at 47, 50, reprinted in POLICE AND THE MEDIA 121,
124 (Patricia A. Kelly ed., 1987) (quoting Los Angeles Deputy Chief Jesse Brewer,
technical advisor to Hill Street Blues) ("[Miany people assume what they are seeing [on
police dramas] is proper and accepted police behavior.").
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In the past, reporters have had problems covering police
misconduct. 29 Tom Reddin, a former chief of the Los Angeles
Police Department (LAPD) who became a television news anchor,
said he hopes the flow of information will improve after the police
brutality investigations following the widely publicized 1991
beating of Rodney King, which was filmed by an amateur
photographer. "[LAPD Chief] Daryl [Gates] may talk about 'my
policemen,' but they are really the people's policemen, and the
people have a right to know about how their policemen perform
their duties."' 30
The Sanusi decision may very well have a contrary effect. At
least one investigative reporter has said that the case may directly
decrease coverage. "This is a troubling decision .... I think that
we may see a great deal less coverage of police activity, not only
of search warrants but of arrests as well.'.. This disincentive
for gathering important news is an unwarranted and unwanted
product of Sanusi's new limitation on an already qualified
privilege.
The Sanusi rule also undermines the policy that the reporters'
testimonial privilege decreases the appearance of press as an arm
of government. The new restriction does not limit itself to illegal
conduct in which the party requesting the information was the
victim. Under the broad rule that illegal conduct by the media bars
or limits the First Amendment privilege, the government could
also obtain the tape. It would not matter that the government
permitted the reporters to accompany the search-the reporters
still engaged in illegal activity to obtain the information that was
requested.
129. Lew Irwin, Cops and Cameras, COLuM. JOURNALISM REV., Sept./Oct. 1991, at
15, 15. The media need to maintain good relationships with both their audience and the
police, which can be difficult when the media present a story critical of an agency
perceived as good. Id.; see also NATIONAL NEWS CoUNcIL, supra note 47, at 13
(describing audience criticisms of broadcast footage of police kneeing a handcuffed,
passive suspect). Pieces showing gratuitous police brutality have been discarded so that
future reporting would not be jeopardized. Irwin, supra, at 16.
130. Irwin, supra note 129, at 17 (second alteration in original).
131. Hall, Ruling May Affect Taping of Searches, supra note 4, at F1 (statement of
Brian Ross, an NBC award-winning investigative reporter).
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Police reporters have difficulties remaining neutral---or at
least being perceived as neutral-when they work with govern-
ment agencies to cover news stories. If the journalists who
accompanied the police officer were suddenly compelled to supply
unpublished information to the prosecutor, the image of press as
law enforcement would be heightened. By testifying or supplying
outtakes, journalists are no longer neutral observers, but rather an
arm of the government.
The perception of press as law enforcement is more likely
where the reporter has accompanied government agents than in
other situations because the journalist is connected to the govern-
ment for the entire episode-newsgathering and testifying.
Although the argument could be made that the press was already
an arm of the government when it obtained access through the law
enforcement officers, 13 2 under that same reasoning journalists
could become officers of the court when they are given preferen-
tial access to celebrated trials or hearings.'33
Courts do not need to attempt to balance the newsgathering
and the illegal activity; adequate remedies are available for
behavior that the law does not permit. Reporters can be prosecut-
ed, and the victim of tortious conduct can sue.'34 Both intru-
sion 3  and trespass13 6 are available as tort claims in many
132. See, e.g., supra note 99.
133. Preferential seating may be given to media representatives when courtroom
capacity is limited. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 581 n.18
(1980). In the 1993 trial of Detroit police officers accused of fatally beating Malice
Green, no courtroom seats were made available to the public-half were reserved for the
families of the victim and the accused and half were reserved for the press. Ann
Sweeney, Judge Hopes to Avoid 'Circus' in Detroit Police Beating Case, Gannett News
Service, May 14, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File.
134. Where a defendant's rights have been severely violated, appellate courts may
also be able to overturn a conviction. See Ascher v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 505
N.W.2d 362 (Minn. App. 1993), review granted, No. C3-93-364, 1993 Minn. LEXIS 754
(Oct. 28, 1993).
135. "One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or
seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other
for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
136.
One is subject to liability to another for trespass, irrespective of whether he
thereby causes harm to any legally protected interest of the other, if he
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jurisdictions. Neither requires that the information obtained be
published before liability is incurred, rather the individuals can sue
based on outtakes alone. These proceedings, separate from the
issue of the reporters' First Amendment privilege not to testify,
allow an individual to recover for any harm actually suffered.
Courts could avoid disincentives from gathering and disseminating
information about a government agency that would arise if the
privilege not to testify were broadly restricted by any illegal
conduct.
CONCLUSION
The traditional three-part test for overcoming the reporters'
qualified First Amendment privilege provides the party requesting
information with an adequate opportunity to obtain material from
the reporter. That test is specifically designed to provide the
requesting party with the information where a balance shows that
the requester's interests outweigh the First Amendment interests
of the subpoenaed reporter.
Prosecutions or tort actions, on the other hand, are designed
to punish or compensate for journalists' misbehavior. Such a
separation will better protect the press, while recognizing the
rights of individuals. It will also allow the press to retain the
benefits of the privilege without being forced to use newsgathering
resources for defending allegations of any illegal conduct.
intentionally
(a) enters land in the possession of the other, or causes a thing or
a third person to do so, or
(b) remains on the land, or
(c) fails to remove from the land a thing which he is under a duty to
remove.
Id. § 158.
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